This op-ed was originally published by American Affairs on May 20, 2026. Click here to read the entire piece.
The United States faces a growing strategic challenge: China has emerged as the world’s dominant energy financier, outpacing the United States nearly ten to one in global markets. China’s growing influence not only directly challenges U.S. strategic interests but also excludes American businesses from immense economic opportunities in the world’s largest foreign markets, such as Brazil and India.
The United States should not try to out-subsidize China, but true American energy dominance requires global market leadership. To expand global markets for U.S. businesses and compete strategically with China, the United States needs to sharpen its export and development finance tools and coordinate them more effectively. For instance, the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) should be empowered with greater scale and flexibility to pursue long-term investments that strengthen supply chains and national security. The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) should have the capacity to back larger American-made energy projects and direct financing toward a wider set of energy technologies. Additionally, the establishment of Energy Security Compacts (ESCs), modeled on the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) existing framework, can leverage these financing tools to align agencies on strategy, support allies, and make energy a pillar of American industrial and economic policy.
China’s Foreign Finance Toolkit
On the morning of July 17, 2022, the floating oil and gas platform Almirante Barroso set sail from the Dalian shipyard in Liaoning province, People’s Republic of China (PRC). After months at sea, it moored above the Búzios oilfield off the coast of Brazil. Petrobras, Brazil’s national oil utility, and two Chinese oil majors, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (cnooc) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), partnered under a joint venture to develop the Búzios field. The China Development Bank (CDB) also provided $1.5 billion in project finance to Petrobras for the Almirante Barroso, the sixth of eleven planned Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading Units (FPSOs) to operate in the Búzios.
Global Chinese investment in Brazil and in global energy markets extends far beyond the Búzios oilfield. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has an array of policy and financial tools that it uses to secure diplomatic influence, strengthen supply chains for domestic Chinese manufacturing, and gain physical control of strategic assets in partner countries. The energy industry is a focus for the PRC because of its importance for the domestic Chinese economy and its national security implications abroad.
Readers of American Affairs will be familiar with the PRC’s negotiated compromise between private “free market” activity and state-directed resource planning. This “state capitalist” system is supported by financial institutions with various degrees of distance from the central CCP command. Closest to the ruling party are the policy banks: the CDB and the Export-Import Bank of China (chexim). Outside their official policy organs, the PRC has stakes in a variety of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including the four largest Chinese banks and some of the world’s largest energy companies, which receive strategic direction from the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (sasac), the arm of the PRC government that manages its ownership of private businesses. Furthest removed are private PRC-flagged companies that are not state-owned, like BYD and Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL), which have no direct connection to the CCP. After years of decentralization dating back to Deng Xiaoping’s tenure, Xi Jinping has aggressively reasserted control in Chinese capital markets, wielding this diverse toolkit of institutions in support of PRC strategy.
Since the turn of the century, the PRC has taken its state-owned system abroad, using the full range of its institutional toolkit. These efforts include, but are by no means limited to, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the PRC’s state-directed development program focused on the Eurasian continent. The PRC’s policy and state-owned banks also engage in sophisticated lending and energy investing alongside leading Western financial institutions.
Until recently, U.S. policymakers and the American public have been left in the dark about the extent of the PRC’s state-owned foreign investments, in part because of the complicated web of institutions that invest on behalf of the PRC. Existing data publication efforts from the AidData lab at the College of William and Mary, the American Enterprise Institute, and others are robust but limited in scope. It was possible to track individual deals from PRC entities, but no single data source existed for all PRC state-owned finance.
There was also a severe lack of information about U.S. investments in international public energy finance. No single source of public data existed on the activities of EXIM, DFC, and the various agencies offering assistance and foreign aid.
New research from Casey Kelly, Justin Williams, Jacob Kincer, and myself at ClearPath has solved these data gaps, which allows us to present comprehensive totals of U.S. and Chinese international public energy finance. Since 2015, China has outspent the United States $446 billion to $45 billion in foreign public energy finance. Without policy action, the United States stands to lose its competitive edge in foreign energy markets, which will hurt American manufacturers and cede strategic ground to the PRC. Policymakers should sharpen the policy toolkit to strengthen the American industrial base, lead the world in energy innovation, and prevail against the CCP. This article will utilize Brazil and India as case studies to analyze PRC and U.S. strategies and chart a path forward.
Click here to read the full article